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Abstract 
 
Empirical research has demonstrated that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer 
period of commitment decreases myopia and thereby increases the willingness to invest in a 
risky asset. In an experimental study, we disentangle the intertwined manipulation of feed-
back frequency and commitment to analyze how each individual variable contributes to the 
change in myopia and how they interact. We find that the period of commitment exerts a sub-
stantial impact and the feedback frequency a far less pronounced impact. There is a strong 
interaction between both variables. The results have significant implications for real world 
intertemporal decision making. 
 
Keywords: intertemporal decision making, myopic loss aversion, feedback frequency, length 
of commitment, evaluation period. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper investigates two important features of intertemporal decision making. First, it con-
siders how decisions are influenced by the number of periods a decision maker is committed 
to a decision, that is, how long he is bound to his initial choice. Consider the stock market as 
an example of intertemporal decision making. Suppose you own some cash and want to make 
an investment in some risky asset, given some fixed planning horizon (e.g. your year of re-
tirement). Does the amount you invest in the risky asset depend on the time you are commit-
ted to your investment? For example, does the decision depend on whether you can change 
the amount invested each month or only each year? The second feature studied is the feedback 
frequency. Using the stock market context again, the question arises as to whether the fre-
quency of feedback influences the amount invested in the risky asset. Take, for example, a 
(risky) investment fund that provides information about its current value each year versus 
another fund that provides similar information each quarter. Does the difference in frequency 
make people invest more or less into such funds? In addition to the impact of each of these 
individual variables, one should consider whether there is any interaction between length of 
commitment and feedback frequency. Knowing the answers to the above questions is essen-
tial. The sheer volume of long-term investments in the stock market makes it worth studying 
factors that influence these investments.  
In addition to the practical relevance of our study, our results are important for inter-
preting previous work. It will be shown that one cannot interpret previous results effectively 
without understanding the independent and joint influence of feedback frequency and com-
mitment. Finally, knowing the influence of both variables might help us to design better in-
vestment decision support tools. 
The concept of myopic loss aversion (MLA), introduced by Benartzi and Thaler 
(1995), can answer some of the above questions. The key idea behind MLA is that, because of 
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loss aversion, a sequence of risky investments looks less attractive in a myopic evaluation. 
This argument was originally confirmed in the controlled environment of two experimental 
studies. Gneezy and Potters (1997) examined which portion of a riskless endowment partici-
pants were willing to invest in a risky asset, whereas Thaler et al. (1997) asked individuals to 
split their money between two assets with different levels of risk. In both studies, a manipula-
tion of the degree of myopia systematically influenced the willingness to invest in the riskier 
alternative. If participants received less frequent feedback and were forced to make a binding 
multi-period decision, they evaluated the assets less myopically and were more willing to ac-
cept the risk. 
Subsequently, these original results on the impact of myopia on risk taking have been 
confirmed and extended in many ways. Haigh and List (2005) replicated the study of Gneezy 
and Potters (1997) with traders from the Chicago Board of Trade and found even stronger 
effects of MLA. Professional experience thus does not seem to weaken the bias. Gneezy et al. 
Kapteyn and Potters (2003) demonstrated the effect in an experimental market setting. Market 
prices for risky assets were significantly higher if feedback was provided less frequently and 
decisions were binding for several periods. Markets thus do not seem to eliminate MLA. 
Langer and Weber (2005) build on Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) to derive 
refined hypotheses about the impact of myopia on risk taking. They confirmed their predic-
tions in an experimental setting similar to that of Gneezy and Potters. Summing up, all the 
evidence on MLA suggests that the willingness to invest in the risky asset is influenced by a 
simultaneous manipulation of feedback frequency and period of commitment.1 However, we 
                                                 
1 A different approach is used in Benartzi and Thaler’s (1999) analysis of MLA. They manipulate the presenta-
tion format of the lottery sequence and exclude a myopic evaluation by displaying the aggregated distribution 
of the sequence instead of the repeated trial format. 
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know almost nothing about each factor’s individual influence or about a possible interaction 
effect.2  
In our study, we find three main results. First, binding decisions cause people to be less 
myopic, perhaps because they must to think through the implications of a longer time horizon. 
Participants invest more in the risky asset in the binding condition than in the non-binding 
condition. This tendency does not disappear over time. Second, providing less frequent feed-
back seems to help people learn over time that it is better to go with the risky prospect (i.e. to 
be less myopic). Third, there is no simple main effect from combining commitment and feed-
back, but an interaction between these two variables. The strongest effect is observed when 
participants are committed to their decisions, but receive frequent feedback. The effect is even 
stronger than the combination of a long period of commitment and less frequent feedback. It 
seems that if people are committed to their decisions, more frequent feedback is helpful be-
cause over time it becomes more salient that occasional losses are outweighed by ultimate 
gains. 
In Section 2, we will present some conceptual thoughts on MLA and introduce both hy-
potheses and our study design. The results are presented in Section 3. The paper concludes 
with a short discussion (Section 4).  
2 Some General Thoughts on MLA and Experimental Design  
2.1 Myopic Loss Aversion 
MLA combines two important behavioral concepts: loss aversion and myopic evaluation. 
Loss aversion refers to the fact that in evaluating a risky alternative, individuals tend to 
                                                 
2 In a recent study, however, Bellemare et al. (2005) address similar questions. Their findings are different from 
our results, which might be due the fact that we implement a multiplicative scenario instead of the additive 
approach commonly used in the literature. This issue will be discussed later.  
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weight losses more heavily than gains.3 Myopia is the short-sightedness that induces a deci-
sion maker to evaluate each alternative within a sequence independently, whereas a rational 
decision maker would evaluate the sequence as a whole. Loss aversion implies that a myopic 
decision maker will invest too little in the risky asset (i.e. myopia leads to decreased willing-
ness to take risk). The question addressed in this paper is to what degree myopia (and thus the 
attitude to risk) is influenced by commitment and by feedback, and how these two variables 
interact.  
Most experimental research on MLA uses the feedback frequency and the period of 
commitment simultaneously to manipulate myopia. Less frequent feedback delivers distribu-
tional information at a more aggregated level and a longer period of commitment induces in-
vestors to think in terms of several periods into the future. The experimental finding that these 
manipulations lead to a higher willingness to invest in a lottery sequence (Gneezy and Potters 
1997, Haigh and List 2005, Gneezy et al. 2003) shows that the feedback frequency and the 
period of commitment in fact influence the degree of myopia in the evaluation. The results 
obtained by Langer and Weber, though questioning the robustness of MLA, provide addi-
tional support for this mechanism. The study extends the argument from myopic loss aversion 
to myopic prospect theory (MPT), considering not only loss aversion, but also diminishing 
value sensitivity. MPT implies that myopia results in stronger risk aversion with respect to 
most sequences of alternatives but results in lower risk aversion for sequences based on alter-
natives with small loss probabilities and high loss magnitudes. They find experimental sup-
port for their refined predictions, demonstrating, on the one hand, that the effect of myopia on 
risk taking is less general than suggested by MLA, but showing at the same time that the basic 
mechanism of inducing different degrees of myopia through the feedback frequency and the 
period of commitment seems to be robust. 
                                                 
3 For a review of loss aversion see Kahneman et al. (1991) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
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In this paper, we are interested only in the phenomenon of inducing different degrees of 
myopia. To avoid potential ambiguity in the results due to the divergences between MLA and 
MPT, our experimental analysis concentrates on alternatives for which predictions about the 
impact of myopia on the attractiveness of the gambling sequence are unique. For a prospect 
that offers a 40% chance of gaining 7% on the invested amount and a 60% chance of losing 
3%, as used in our experiment, a less myopic evaluation of multiple plays should generally 
(i.e. in MLA and MPT) be more attractive. 
In addition to the separate consideration of commitment and feedback, our design differs 
from most used in the literature (e.g. Gneezy and Potters 1997) in one important respect. Most 
studies use an additive approach (i.e. the decision maker faces identical investment opportuni-
ties in each period, and the aggregated outcome of the decision sequence is the sum of all sin-
gle decision outcomes): 
 [ ]∑
=
α−++⋅α⋅=
T
1t
)]t(1[)]t(r1[)t(XFW , (1) 
where FW is the final wealth, X is the identical (new) endowment in each period, α(t) is the 
proportion of endowment invested into the risky asset in period t with 0 ≤ α(t) ≤ 1, r(t) is the 
return on the risky asset in period t, and T the planning horizon.4 
We use a multiplicative approach instead, in which the returns of the periods are com-
pounded. Investors receive an initial endowment that is transferred from period to period, al-
tered by the outcomes of the investment decisions: 
   [ ]∏
=
α−++⋅α⋅=
T
1t
)]t(1[)]t(r1[)t(Y'FW , (2) 
                                                 
4 The fraction 1-α(t) is kept at hand and thus remains unchanged. 
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where FW’ is the final wealth, Y is the initial endowment, α(t) is the proportion of current 
wealth invested in the risky asset in period t, r(t) is the return on the investment in period t, 
and T the planning horizon.  
Clearly, the multiplicative case is more realistic than the additive case as it more closely 
resembles the accrual of returns in real asset markets. On the other hand, it might lead to 
weaker results in terms of MLA. Myopia must be expected to be less extreme, since the obvi-
ous relevance of early round decisions for later round endowments might induce investors to 
think less myopically, even in conditions that support myopic thinking in the additive case. It 
is useful to examine how strong the effects of MLA remain in this more realistic multiplica-
tive setting.  
In the following section we present the hypotheses and then explain which design is used 
to test them.  
2.2  Hypotheses 
This paper deals with the effect of commitment and feedback on myopia, which itself influ-
ences the amount invested in the risky asset. As described in formula (2), α(t) is the percent-
age of current wealth a person invests in the risky asset in period t. Thus α(t), or just α if the 
specific period is of no relevance, is the key variable for which hypotheses should be derived. 
We use the notation α* for the average percentage invested over the full planning horizon. 
There will be two conditions for commitment: “c” for single period commitment and “C” for 
multiple period commitment, and two conditions for feedback: “f” for frequent feedback 
which will be given each period and “F” for less frequent feedback. Thus, the variable αCf(t) 
denotes, for example, the percentage of wealth invested in the risky asset in period t, where 
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the decision maker is committed to his investment decision for multiple periods, but receives 
feedback about outcomes after each period.5  
 The first hypothesis states that we can extend the results presented in the literature for 
the additive case to the multiplicative case: A longer period of commitment and simultane-
ously less feedback will increase the amount invested in the risky asset.6  
 Hypothesis 1:   αcf*  < αCF*. 
The second hypothesis states that both commitment and feedback frequency will individually 
influence the amount invested in the risky asset. Section 2.1 has demonstrated that the degree 
of myopia influences α. Therefore, both more commitment and a lower feedback frequency 
should reduce myopia. This is the rationale behind Hypothesis 2.  
 Hypothesis 2:  αc•*< αC•* and α•f*  < α•F*. 
Ex ante, we see no reason to hypothesize any interaction effect between both variables (even 
if we did in fact find one subsequently).  
 Thus far, we have considered the average allocation over time. Next, we will present 
some refined hypotheses with respect to allocation patterns over time. Previous experimental 
research has shown that allocations to risky assets will generally increase over time, inde-
pendent of the specific treatment. Langer and Weber found such an effect for an additive allo-
cation scenario. Similar empirical evidence can be found in Weber and Camerer (1992), 
where individuals played an investment game. We believe that learning plays an important 
role in these asset allocation experiments. Over time, as subjects learn to cope with the risky 
situation in the experiments, ambiguity about the process as a whole diminishes. This results 
in increased risk taking.  
                                                 
5 We will denote α•f (t) and α•F (t) if we consider the average amount invested for “f” and “F” for both commit-
ment conditions. Note that αC• (t) cannot change for those periods in which the decision is binding.  
6 It should be clear that decreasing the decision making flexibility is not just a framing issue, but a marginal 
change in the decision problem even from a normative point of view. As Gneezy and Potters (1997) argue, 
however, the effect on the risk taking behavior should be minor. 
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Hypothesis 3:  For all treatments, the proportion of wealth α(t) invested in the 
risky asset increases over time.  
Thus far, we have not considered a possible difference between the effect of commitment and 
that of feedback. Clearly, it should make a difference at the beginning of the experiment. 
Commitment should have an immediate effect, as if comitted subjects immediately become 
less myopic. By contrast, feedback should influence subjects only over time (and not have any 
effect in period 1). 
 Hypothesis 4:  α•f(1) = α•F(1)      and     αc•(1) < αC•(1). 
 
2.3 Experimental Design 
In our computerized experiment, participants were confronted with 30 independent draws of 
the same gamble. At the beginning of the experiment, each individual received an initial en-
dowment of 25 € that could be invested totally or partially in a lottery L = (+7 %, .4; 3 %, .6) 
that increased the invested amount by 7 % or decreased it by 3 % with the stated probabilities. 
This gamble has an expected overall return of +1 %. Following the multiplicative case, the 
endowment in period t+1 was equal to the outcome of the investment in period t plus the 
amount transferred, thus not invested in period t: Y(t + 1) = Y (t) [α (t) [1 + r(t) ] + [1–α (t) ]]. 
Each allocation decision had to be stated in percentage terms, so we explicitly asked for the 
proportion α, not the absolute investment amount.7 Participants were fully informed about the 
return distribution of the asset and the fact that asset returns of different periods were stochas-
tically independent.  
                                                 
7 Percentage allocations seem to be more natural for real world stock/bond allocation decisions. It should be 
noted that Gneezy and Potters asked for amounts and not for percentages in their original work in the additive 
framework. However, since Langer and Weber replicated the results of Gneezy and Potters while asking for 
percentages, it does not look like this design difference has a major impact on the results. 
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Two factors, the period of commitment and the feedback frequency, were varied within 
the experiment, resulting in a 2x2 design. Short term commitment (condition c) was for one 
period; longer term commitment was for three periods (condition C). Frequent feedback was 
provided in each period (condition f), and infrequent feedback was after each third period 
(condition F) . 
In design cf, subjects were asked in each period to make a new allocation decision (i.e. to 
state which portion of their current endowment they wanted to invest in the risky asset). Fol-
lowing the decision, the lottery was played out and the change in wealth calculated and dis-
played. Figure 1 shows a typical screen from experimental condition cf.  
 
 
Fig. 1: Screenshot from condition”bf” (translated). 
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On the top left side of the screen, current wealth (here 28.62 €) is displayed. Below, the allo-
cation decision is made either by using a slider or typing in the number (here 91 %). The 
feedback box at the bottom appears after the draw and presents the outcome of the gamble 
(here –3 %) as well as the calculation of gains or losses and the new level of wealth (here 
27.84 €). 
In design Cf, participants’ allocation decisions were binding for three rounds. Therefore, al-
though the gambles were played out and feedback was presented in each round, participants 
could only adjust their allocation after each third round. In design cF, feedback about the out-
come of the investments was presented at a more aggregated level. After each third round, 
participants received information about the total change of wealth since the last provision of 
feedback. Nevertheless, allocations could be adjusted in each individual round.8 In design CF, 
participants made binding decisions for three rounds and obtained feedback information only 
about the aggregate change of wealth over the three periods. 
 The experimental subjects were masters students from Mannheim University, recruited 
in an advanced finance class. Overall, 107 students took part in the experiment, 26 in treat-
ment CF and 27 in each of the other treatments. 9 They entered the computer lab individually 
and were randomly assigned to one of the treatments by the computer. They read the instruc-
tions on the screen, were given the opportunity to ask questions, and then started the experi-
ment independently.10 The outcomes of the gambles were generated randomly for each indi-
vidual participant by the computer, according to the specified return distribution. On average, 
the experiment took about 30 minutes, 15 minutes for reading the instructions and 15 minutes 
for the 10 (in treatments Cf and CF) or 30 (in treatments cf and cF) allocation decisions. All 
                                                 
8 Undoubtedly, this is a rather strange investment condition. We included it nevertheless to cover the complete 
2x2 design. 
9 Somewhat reflecting the typical gender distribution in advanced finance classes in Germany, there were only 
14 female students taking part in the study (13%). That explains why we cannot present any second order re-
sults on gender differences in the following. 
10 The complete instructions can be downloaded from the journal webpage. 
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participants received a flat fee of € 3 for showing up and had a 10 % chance of being selected 
by the computer for real payment according to their final level of wealth in the experiment. 
The twelve selected individuals earned an additional € 30.19 on average. The payment proce-
dure was made known to participants ex ante. 
3 Results11 
The average allocation for the different conditions are given in Table 1 and in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 1: Average proportion of wealth invested in risky asset lottery over all 30 rounds 
 
 
Table 1 indicates that we found a main effect for commitment (αc•* < αC•*, p < 0.01, Mann-
Whitney one-tailed), but no effect for feedback. Thus Hypothesis 2 can only be partly con-
firmed. This is surprising, given the fact that in most other studies presented in the literature 
so far, the feedback frequency is suggested to be the driving force. Figure 2 helps to explain 
the surprising result. It clearly demonstrates that there is a significant interaction effect 
(ANOVA, p < .05) between both the commitment and feedback frequency variables. Either 
manipulation on its own increases the percentage invested in the risky asset (αcf * < αCf *, p < 
.01 and αcf * < αcF*, p < .05) as the dotted lines illustrate. However, the joint effect is reversed 
(αCf* > αCF*, n.s) or non-existent (αcF*≈  αCF *) at best. The data indicate that the effect of a 
longer period of commitment is stronger when the feedback frequency is greater. We will 
discuss this finding in more detail below. Nevertheless, we can confirm hypothesis 1 and thus 
replicate the earlier findings in a multiplicative setting (αcf * < αCF *, p < .05). 
 
                                                 
11 Note that all tests in the result section are nonparametric and are based on medians unless specified otherwise.  
 αc•* αC•* α•f * α•F* 
 n=54 n=53 n=54 n=53 
Mean 58.4% 69.4% 63.3% 64.4% 
Median 57.8% 70.0% 64.3% 64.7% 
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Fig. 2: Interaction of commitment and feedback manipulation 
 
 
Next, we consider the hypotheses relating to the development of allocations over time. To 
give an initial overview of the data, Figure 3 displays the average allocation to the risky asset 
at each point of time, α*(t), for each condition. Allocations seem to increase over time in gen-
eral, as predicted in hypothesis 3, though the effect is far from being monotonic. 
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Fig. 3: Average allocation to the risky asset for each period and each treatment 
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For a first simple test of Hypothesis 3, we compute the average allocation for both individual 
in the second half (periods 16-30) and in the first half (periods 1-15) of the experiment and 
define the ‘trend’ to be the difference between these numbers. As shown in Table 2, the me-
dian trend turns out to be positive in three of the four treatments. It is highest in treatment cF 
(11%) and lowest in treatment CF (0%). Using a Wilcoxon signed rank test, the trend is sig-
nificantly positive at a 1% level for treatments Cf and cF and on a 5% level for treatment cf. 
In treatment CF, the effect is insignificant; we even observe more participants with a negative 
(11) than a positive (9) trend. 
 
 
Tab. 2: Change in average allocation in first half (rounds 1-15) to average allocation in second half (rounds 16-
30) of the experiment. 
 
 
Hypothesis 4 states that the allocation in Period 1 is the same both for low and high feedback 
frequencies and that it is greater in the case where subjects make binding decisions for three 
periods. Calculating the medians (means) we obtain  
α•f(1) = 50.0% (49.3%) ,  α•F(1) = 50.0% (49.8%) and  
αc•(1) = 36.5% (41.5%),  αC•(1) = 50.0% (57.6%) .  
The difference between α•f(1) and α•F(1) is insignificant, whereas the difference between 
αc•(1) and αC• (1) is significant on a 1% level. The results clearly support Hypothesis 4. 
In our examination of Hypotheses 1-3, we considered average allocations over the 
complete course of the experiment. We now investigate how much subjects will allocate to 
the risky investment in the long run. This seems especially important in light of the applica-
tions mentioned in the introduction. Based on the allocations during the experiment, we esti-
Design cf Cf  cF  CF 
 N=27 n=27 n=27 n=26 
Mean trend 7.2% 9.5% 10.5% 3.2% 
Median trend 7.3% 6.0% 11.0% 0.0% 
# of subjects with pos. (neg) trend 20 (7) 17 (5) 17 (6) 9 (11) 
Signed rank test (Wilcoxson) p<0.05 p<0.01 p<0.01 n.s. 
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mate a process that converges to some limit allocation α(∞), or α∞ for short, for t →∞. More 
explicitly, we consider a partial adjustment model, 
           α’(t) = b+c⋅α’(t-1),         (3) 
and estimate the parameters b, c, and α’(1) to minimize the quadratic deviation of α’ from 
α.12  
Because of the interfering end effects in the data (see Figure 3), we exclude the allocations of 
the final three rounds from the fitting procedure.13 We further impose the natural restriction 
on the allocation function α’(t) to remain within the domain [0, 1] for all t. This is achieved 
by restricting the estimated parameters to α’(1)∈ [0, 1], c∈ (0, 1), and b∈ [0, 1-c]. The func-
tion then monotonically converges to the long run allocation )1( cb−∞ =α ∈[0, 1] for t →∞.  
To provide a general impression of the results, Figure 4 presents such fitted functions α’(t) for 
the average allocations within each treatment. It can be seen that α’(t) increases in all four 
treatments (providing further support for hypothesis 3). The values of b, c, α’(1), and 
)1()( cb−=∞α  are summarized in Table 3. Again, the interaction effect is shown in the data as 
αCf (∞) and αcF (∞) are both larger than αCF (∞). In the long run, the combined manipulation 
of feedback frequency and period of commitment thus seems to have less impact on the will-
ingness to invest in the risky asset than each manipulation alone. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 This process is used in market experiments to estimate equilibrium prices (see, e.g. Camerer et al., 1989). 
13 Such end-effects are also found in other similar experiments such as Weber and Camerer. We believe that 
these experiments reflect the conventional wisdom that one should lower the exposure to risk at the end of the 
planning horizon. 
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Fig.4: Average allocations in each treatment and fitted process α’(t) = b+c⋅α’(t-1). 
 
 
 
Tab. 3: Process α’(t) = b+c⋅α’(t-1) fitted on average allocations in each design. 
 
To test the significance of the long run effects, we use the procedure described above to fit 
functions α’(t) to each individual’s allocations and compare the resulting individual long run 
allocations α(∞) for the different treatments. The results are summarized in Table 4.  
 
 
Condition cf Cf  cF  CF  
α’(1) 38.0 % 61.7 % 39.1 % 53.8 % 
b 0.091 0.064 0.109 0.132 
c 0.836 0.923 0.849 0.804 
)('lim)( )1( ttc
b αα ∞→− ==∞  55.8 % 82.8 % 72.1 % 67.7 % 
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Tab. 4: Long run allocations α(∞), determined individually for each participant.  
 
Interestingly, in conditions Cf and cF more than half of the participants have an α(∞)-value of 
100% (i.e. in the long run their willingness to invest is only limited by the fact that at most the 
complete endowment can be invested). A Mann-Whitney test shows that αcf(∞) is signifi-
cantly smaller than αCf (∞) on a 1% level, whereas the difference between αcf(∞) and αcF(∞) 
is only marginally significant.14 Thus, even in the long run, subjects invest more in the risky 
asset when they are committed to their decisions or feedback is given more frequently; no 
such effect is observed if both manipulations are present.15 
4 Discussion 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of commitment and feedback frequency on myopic loss 
aversion and examine the robustness and determinants of the phenomenon. In contrast to pre-
vious studies, our experimental design is based on a multiplicative scenario that more closely 
resembles the investment process in real asset markets. We further disentangle the intertwined 
manipulation of feedback frequency and period of commitment, commonly examined in con-
junction in previous research, to understand better how each aspect contributes to the change 
in myopia.  
                                                 
14 Marginal significance is also given for the difference between αCf (∞) and αCF (∞). 
15 Thus, the long run data is not in line with hypothesis 1 and with the findings of previous studies. It should be 
noted, however, that previous research mostly concentrates on average allocations over time and does not 
consider estimated long run allocations. Thus, our results are not directly comparable with those in the litera-
ture. 
 
 αcf (∞) αCf (∞) αcF (∞) αCF (∞)  
mean  62.0 % 83.8 % 78.0 % 67.0 % 
median  71.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 71.0 % 
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We find that each isolated manipulation has an impact on myopia and thereby the wil-
lingness to invest, even in a multiplicative scenario. Surprisingly, we find a strong and persis-
tent interaction effect. The effect of the feedback frequency is reversed for the long period of 
commitment. This is an interesting result, because the manipulation of feedback frequency is 
usually considered the main driving force behind myopic loss aversion effects in experimental 
studies. The underlying intuition is that a longer period of commitment induces the decision 
maker to consider the consequences of the investment decision in a more far-sighted manner, 
thereby limiting the negative effects of narrow framing (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993). This 
effect is especially strong if the decision makers receive frequent feedback (i.e. they inevita-
bly learn over time that occasional losses are outweighed by larger gains). Limiting feedback 
helps people learn not to behave myopically, but this is less the case when decisions entail 
commitment.  
The documented effect of decision flexibility on risk taking behavior has obvious rele-
vance for investment advice and the design of saving plans. Making investment decisions 
unchangeable for several periods could, somewhat counterintuitively, help to increase the 
investor’s willingness to invest in risky assets. Stock funds should advertise the possibility to 
make, for example, a year long commitment, but should send statements more frequently dur-
ing the year.  
A number of questions remain. We found the effects described in the literature to per-
sist in a multiplicative setting, whereas we do not know which of the two settings (additive or 
multiplicative) induces stronger effects. Interestingly, in similar research, but in an additive 
investment scenario, Bellemare et al. do not find the interaction between feedback frequency 
and period of commitment that we observe. This suggests that it might be worthwhile to ex-
amine further the impact of the investment scenario (additive vs. multiplicative) on the deter-
minants of myopia. Furthermore, our explanation of the strong effects of frequent feedback 
and longer commitment is ex post. It would be worth running replicative studies to gain a 
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greater level of understanding of this important interaction effect. Finally, it is not clear to 
what degree our results (as well as the results presented in the literature so far) depend on the 
specific parameters of the experiment. In this first study building on the multiplicative sce-
nario, we intentionally chose a risk profile that was as simple as possible and seemed suitable 
to produce myopic loss aversion effects.16 Of course, it can be questioned whether the per-
centage changes (and incentive sizes) were large enough to induce participants to think care-
fully about their decisions. Further experimental studies might be able to shed light on such 
questions.  
Even more important, and surely also more challenging, would it be to look for effects 
of myopic loss aversion in the field. We are not aware of any existing empirical data set that 
would allow an immediate and clean test of the myopia effects discussed in this paper.17 
However, it might be possible to convince investment companies to provide slightly different 
investment environments to their customers (e.g. different feedback frequencies) to mimic the 
manipulations of the existing experimental studies. Finding similar effects of myopia in such 
real world data would not only eliminate the usual concerns about the insufficient incentives 
and artifical investment environment underlying the experimental findings, but it could also 
be extremely helpful to demonstrate to practitioners the relevance of behavioral research.  
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